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Abstract 
Research on the economic and human toll of natural disasters focuses on the short-term, often 
ignoring the important long-term impacts of these catastrophic events. The main reason for the 
lack of empirical research on the long-term is the inherent and unavoidable difficulty in 
identifying any long-term impacts and attributing them to the disaster. On the 23rd of May 
1960, a devastating tsunami struck the city of Hilo on the island of Hawaii. Remarkably, there 
was no significant injury or damage elsewhere in the Hawaiian Islands. This tsunami provides a 
unique natural experiment as the tsunami was unexpected, and the other Hawaiian Islands, 
which were not hit by the tsunami, provide an ideal control group that enables us to precisely 
identify the counter-factual.  We use a newly developed synthetic control methodology 
formalized in Abadie et al. (2010) to measure the long-term impacts of the tsunami. We find 
that while wages did not decline noticeably, population and employment trends shifted. Fifteen 
years after the event, unemployment was still 32% higher and population was still 9% lower 
than it would have been had the tsunami not occurred. We also find a corresponding decrease 
in the number of employers and sugar production in the county. 
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1. Introduction 
 Research on the economic and human toll of natural disasters tends to focus on the 
short-term – i.e., the impact of the disaster in the first couple of years.1 From a policy 
perspective, however, the long-term impacts of these catastrophic events are equally 
important. From a theoretical perspective, the long-term impact of disasters is also of intense 
interest, since much of the growth literature, especially neo-classical growth theory (Solow, 
1956), predicts that in the long-term the region of interest will revert back to its fundamentals-
dependent steady-state. The main reason for the lack of empirical research on this topic is the 
inherent and unavoidable difficulty in identifying any long-term impacts and distinguishing 
these from other post-disaster occurrences.  Even only a decade after an event, how many of 
the observed changes in an economy can confidently be attributed to the event itself?  
 Tsunami is a Japanese term for large, sometimes destructive waves caused by sudden 
changes in the topography of the sea floor such as those generated by earthquakes. On the 
23rd of May 1960, a devastating tsunami struck the city of Hilo on the island of Hawaii, killing 
61 people, injuring 282 and inundating 600 acres. Remarkably, there was no significant injury or 
damage anywhere else in the Hawaiian islands. This tsunami event provides a unique natural 
experiment for several reasons: (1) there is now many years of detailed post-disaster economic 
data as well as a substantial amount of pre-disaster data; (2) the tsunami was unusual and 
unexpected (beyond a few hours advance notice) and thus clearly an exogenous event; (3) the 
other Hawaiian Islands, which were not hit by the tsunami, provide an ideal control group that 
enable us to precisely identify a counter-factual; and (4) Hawaii’s experience with disasters is 
                                                             
1 See Noy (2009), Strobl (2012), and Loayza et al. (2012) for cross-country comparative research. 
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not unique, so it is likely that the patterns we describe may repeat elsewhere.   
 To test for the long-term consequences of this disaster, we use a new methodology 
recently formalized in Abadie et al. (2010 and 2012) and previously employed in Abadie and 
Gardeazabal (2003).  The methodology is based on simulating conditions after an exogenous 
event based on the relationship to a control group.  The island of Hawaii’s similarity to the 
other Hawaiian Islands2, which were subject to almost identical initial conditions and 
subsequent shocks, with the exception of the tsunami, enables us to implement this 
methodology and obtain more precise estimates of the long-term impact of the disaster. We 
have a fairly long time-series of data from before the exogenous event, and our control group 
consists of the three other Hawaiian counties. The model presented by Abadie et al. (2010 and 
2012) presents an estimation technique uniquely suitable to such a set-up, as weighted 
projections from the control group can be made with a relatively small sample of pre-treatment 
observations and a limited number of controls.  
 Any investigation into the long-term effects of natural disasters is non-trivial since both 
growth theories and current attempts to empirically examine them obtain contradicting results.  
Growth theories, for example, can suggest either a growth spurt after a massive destruction of 
capital, a permanent or temporary growth slowdown, or no observable effect beyond the very 
short term. There is little empirical research on the long-term impact of exogenous shocks on 
growth dynamics within the context of this literature.3 
                                                             
2 ‘Hawaii’ is normally used both as the name for the whole island archipelago and for its largest (but not most 
populated) island. To avoid confusion we refer to the State of Hawaii and to Hawaii Island, respectively. 
3 There is a body of research on the long-term impact of war-related destruction, following Davis and Weinstein 
(2002); see a summary of this research in Cavallo and Noy (2011). 
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 In the policy arena, when longer term effects have been contemplated, there has been 
substantial discussion about the choice people make to stay and rebuild what was destroyed, or 
to leave and rebuild their lives elsewhere.4 Thus, we start our investigation without strong 
priors. In the next section, we discuss relevant empirical work regarding the ex-post impacts of 
large disaster events. In section 3, we describe the economy of Hilo, the island of Hawaii and 
the state of Hawaii, as well as the tsunami’s initial impact.  We also describe the unique archival 
data we collected. Section 4 details the synthetic control methodology and our modifications to 
it, and section 5 describes our results on the long-term impact of the tsunami on Hilo’s local 
economy and population. We conclude with a discussion of these results and implications, 
particularly in the context of future climate change.   
 
2.   The economics of natural disasters 
Our project is an investigation of one event.  A substantial number of studies of specific 
natural disaster events have been conducted over the past two decades, but almost all these 
case studies have been completed only a few years after the disaster has occurred and 
therefore focus on describing its short term effects (e.g., Horwich, 2000, on the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake; Vigdor, 2008, on hurricane Katrina of 2005; or Huigen and Jens, 2006, on a super-
typhoon in the Philippines). Vigdor (2008), for example, documents significant population 
declines in a carefully constructed investigation of Katrina’s impact on New Orleans. However, 
as he acknowledges, it is difficult to separate these declines from a general declining trend in 
the area’s population that long predates Katrina or to evaluate whether this demographic 
                                                             
4
 Aldrich (2011) terms this the voice vs. exit choice. 
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impact will persist in the decades to come.5 We are aware of three papers that describe the 
long term enduring macroeconomic or aggregate demographic impacts of specific natural 
disasters: Coffman and Noy (2012) on Hurricane Iniki in 1992, duPont and Noy (2012) on the 
1995 Kobe earthquake, and Hornbeck (2012) on the American Dust Bowl during the 1930s 
Great Depression era. We will discuss these papers findings within the discussion of our own 
results in section 5.6  
Before we proceed to discuss our research, we would like to briefly emphasize that the 
cross-country literature examining the costs of natural disasters is as constrained in examining 
short-run effects as the case-study literature discussed above. Skidmore and Toya (2002) 
initiated the recent research on longer term impacts, and found a positive correlation between 
the frequency of disasters and long-term GDP growth. On the other hand, Cavallo et al. (2010) 
fail to find any impact on per-capita GDP in the long-run of even very catastrophic events at the 
national level, and Deryugina (2011) fails to find much impact of US hurricanes at the county 
level.7 
 
3. Hilo, the Island of Hawaii, the State of Hawaii and the tsunami of 1960 
                                                             
5
 Another set of papers looks at short- and medium-term adjustment at the individual/household level to large 
natural exogenous shocks (e.g., Carter et al., 2007, on the 1998-2000 Ethiopian draught and Hurricane Mitch in 
Honduras in 1998 and Sawada and Shimizutani, 2008, on the aftermath of the 1995 Kobe earthquake). 
6 A limited number of research projects has examined the long-term impact of specific catastrophic events on 
individuals/households (e.g., Maccini and Yang, 2009 on declines in rainfall in Indonesia; and Gørgens et al., 2012, 
on the Great Chinese Famine of 1959-1961). 
7 Cavallo et al. (2010) find that disasters that were followed by very significant institutional/political changes do 
have long-term impacts. The prototypical case they discuss is the Iran earthquake of 1978 that was followed less 
than a year later by the Islamic revolution. Deryugina (2011) finds no macroeconomic impact at the county level, 
but only after very substantial fiscal transfers from the Federal government. 
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After the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893, Hawaii was annexed to the United 
States as a territory in 1898. After a number of failed attempts to achieve statehood, the United 
States Congress passed the Hawaii Admission Act in 1959, which was followed by a referendum 
offering residents of Hawaii two choices: to remain as a territory or become a state. 94% chose 
statehood and Hawaii officially became a state on August 21st, 1959. 
The State of Hawaii is comprised of four counties: the City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii 
County, Maui County, and Kauai County. Honolulu and Hawaii counties are composed of the 
islands of Oahu and Hawaii, respectively. Hilo is the largest town and political center of Hawaii 
County/Island. Kauai County includes the island of Kauai and the tiny island of Niihau; Maui 
County includes the islands of Maui, Lanai, and Molokai. In 1960 (the year of the tsunami), the 
population of the Hawaiian Islands that comprise the State of Hawaii was about 632,000 while 
today it is home to nearly 1.3 million people.8 In 1960, 79% of the population lived in the City 
and County of Honolulu, while the rest was divided about 10% in Hawaii County, 7% in Maui 
and 4% on Kauai.9  
Similar to many other islands in the Pacific, tourism is the largest private sector industry in 
Hawaii today; but in 1960, agriculture and U.S. federal government spending (much of it 
military-related) still dominated the economy. In 1960, the city of Hilo was the center of 
economic and governmental activities on the island of Hawaii. At that time, 42% of the island’s 
population lived in Hilo. The city and its vicinity accounted for 70% of gross retail sales and 83% 
                                                             
8
 Source: State of Hawaii, Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism,  http://hawaii.gov/dbedt 
(accessed 31/05/2012). 
9 Data are obtained from the University of Hawaii Economic Research dataset, www.uhero.hawaii.edu (accessed 
31/05/2012). The population distribution is roughly the same today with 80% in Honolulu County, 8% in Hawaii 
and Maui counties and 4% in Kauai County. 
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of gross wholesale receipts on the island. Almost all non-agricultural manufacturing activities 
were located in the city. The major sources of income on the island were agriculture 
(dominated by sugar but including other crops and animals) and tourism.  
Although the counties (islands) differed in terms of population in 1960, they were 
nonetheless quite similar in terms of socio-economic conditions. They were largely exporting 
comparable products (sugar and other agricultural products) and services (mostly tourism) and 
they were subject to similar external political and economic shocks.  Not only do the counties 
still share similar economic structures but, as they belong to the same political entity, they are 
subject to the same institutional and legal frameworks.  Most taxes are handled at the state 
level and most expenditures are also decided at the state level; for example, uniquely in the 
United States, the public education system includes a single state-wide school district.   
As the only island state in the US, located in the heart of the Pacific Ocean, and surrounded 
by the ‘Ring of Fire’, Hawaii is particularly susceptible to tsunamis. Since 1812, there have been 
171 recorded tsunamis in the Hawaiian Islands. Extremely destructive tsunamis have struck the 
islands at least a dozen times since written records began in the early 19th century. Since 1837, 
there have been seven tsunamis that directly resulted in the loss of life. Almost 300 people 
have been killed by tsunamis in Hawaii with the two most deadly tsunamis occurring in 1946 
(159 deaths) and 1960 (61 deaths). The 1960 tsunami, the most recent tsunami to cause severe 
damage and destruction, is the focus of this paper. 
The 1946 tsunami was caused by an earthquake in the Aleutian islands of Alaska and 
travelled 2,300 miles before hitting the Hawaiian Islands in the early morning of April 1st. The 
tsunami caused damage and death in all four counties with the most severe damage and loss of 
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life occurring in Hawaii County. Almost 500 homes and businesses were destroyed and another 
1,000 were severely damaged. The cost of the destruction reached $300 million (measured in 
2011 dollars). 
Largely in response to the unprecedented destruction and loss of life in the 1946 tsunami, 
the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC) was established in 1949 at Ewa Beach on the island 
of Oahu. The PTWC today is part of an international network of tsunami warning systems. The 
center receives information from seismograph stations and whenever an earthquake above 6.5 
on the Richter scale occurs, scientists at the center are alerted by special alarms and begin 
calculating whether a tsunami has been generated and where it is likely to strike. If the 
earthquake is strong enough to cause a tsunami and the epicenter is located close enough to 
the ocean, the center will issue a “Tsunami Watch”. If tide gauges at different locations in the 
Pacific Ocean subsequently confirm that a tsunami has been generated, then a “Tsunami 
Warning” is issued. When a Tsunami Warning occurs, sirens sound, emergency radio broadcasts 
are initiated, and Hawaii state agencies begin evacuating citizens from low-lying areas.   
On the 22nd of May 1960, a tsunami was generated off the coast of Concepción, Chile, as a 
result of three major earthquakes there. In Chile itself, 2,000 people were killed and large areas 
of the southern coast were destroyed. The tsunami continued to wreak havoc as it spread 
across the Pacific. Pitcairn Island, New Guinea, New Zealand, the Philippines and Okinawa were 
all hit by the tsunami and close to 300 lives were lost. Damage was recorded in Oregon, 
California, the Kamchatka Peninsula and Samoa. On Easter Island, the tsunami picked up and 
moved some of the famous moai statues a distance of five hundred feet.   
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The tsunami struck the Hawaiian Islands just after midnight in the morning of the 23rd of 
May. In general, the wave action along Hawaiian shores was noticeable but not very significant 
or destructive (akin to a sped-up tidal change). However, in Hilo Bay on the island of Hawaii, the 
third wave of the tsunami converted into a bore and caused severe damage. For comparison, 
on the island of Oahu, the average run-up recorded was 7 feet. In Hilo, run-ups as high as 35 
feet were recorded near the waterfront area directly south of the breakwater. Thus, nearly all 
of the tsunami’s effects were centered on Hilo.   
The 1960 tsunami killed 61 people and injured 282, all of them in Hilo. This is despite a 
Tsunami Warning being issued at 6:47pm by the PTWC, at least 5 hours before the tsunami’s 
arrival. Warnings were issued by radio, television, public address and in person. Only a third of 
the residents in the inundated areas chose to evacuate, as many did not feel there was much of 
a risk and the warnings were quite ambiguous (Lachman et al., 1960). In particular, radio 
stations carried reports from Tahiti that the waves were only three feet high. This led to a false 
sense of complacency; Tahiti is well-protected from tsunami waves because of large offshore 
reefs, which dissipate the force of the waves. A change in the siren system also caused 
confusion. Some Hilo residents even went down to the shore to see if they could observe what 
they thought would be a small tsunami. At 1:04am, a 20-foot high vertical wall of water washed 
through Hilo town. A minute later, most of the island was plunged into darkness and panic 
spread. 
Nearly 600 acres were inundated and in about half of this area, all buildings were destroyed 
completely (Eaton at al., 1961). In terms of the size of the destroyed area, this would be roughly 
equivalent to 60 blocks in downtown Manhattan. The destruction was most severe along 
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Kamehameha Avenue, the main thoroughfare of the city. There was hardly any damage to the 
other islands in Hawaii. Only a total of eight houses were destroyed on Maui, one on Lanai and 
none on Oahu, Molokai or Kauai. There was some flooding and damage caused to buildings’ 
walls and their contents but nothing compared to the destruction in Hilo. The estimated 
damage to residential, business and public properties was almost $169 million and 158 firms 
were directly affected by the tsunami (Hung, 1961). 
 
3.1 Historical data for the state of Hawaii  
We obtained and searched through archival records to gather information on variables of 
economic interest: population, employment, wages and production. 10 The variables we 
observe and analyze are based on data availability both pre- and post-tsunami.  We are not 
testing a specific theory of post-disaster developments; largely because no such comprehensive 
theory exists and speculations regarding typical post-disaster developments are varied and 
numerous. We use annual county-level panel data for the City and County of Honolulu, Hawaii 
County, Kauai County, and Maui County. The period available for each series varies based on 
the data collection history of the given source. We truncate data collection at 1975 due to 
structural changes in the state of Hawaii, especially the shift from agriculture to tourism. We 
suspect the relationships between the islands would not be stable past 1975 and, as a result, 
the assumptions of the synthetic control method would not hold beyond this period. 
                                                             
10 In addition to the variables mentioned, motor vehicle registrations were collected for the period 1932-1975, but 
there was no discernible impact from the tsunami. We also collected but did not analyze data on Job Counts due to 
concerns about how this data has been collected over time (see Appendix). We have similar concerns regarding 
the data on Total Wages but present these results in section 5 for the sake of comparison. 
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Civilian Resident Population was collected from intercensal population estimates from the 
Department of Planning and Economic Development11 of the State of Hawaii covering the 
period 1940-1975. Total Wages and Number of Employers were collected from annual 
“Employment and Payrolls” reports from the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations of 
the State of Hawaii from 1951 to 1975. Unemployment data covering 1958 through 1975 was 
collected from the Hawaii County and the State of Hawaii Data Books. Sugar Production was 
collected from annual reports of the Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii for the period 1948 to 
1975. Table 1 displays summary statistics for each variable and county over the entire period. 
 
4. Methodology – synthetic control for comparative case studies  
The synthetic control methodology, proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and 
developed further by Abadie et al. (2010, 2012), creates a counterfactual based on appropriate 
comparison units. The goal is to replicate the characteristics of the region receiving the 
intervention (in our case the 1960 Hilo tsunami) using a linear combination of the same 
characteristics for regions not receiving the intervention.12 Characteristics are measured as pre-
intervention, possibly weighted, averages of relevant variables of interest. The weights of the 
resulting linear combination are then used to compute a synthetic time series representing the 
outcome for the region receiving the intervention in the (counterfactual) case that it did not 
receive the intervention.  
 
                                                             
11 This department was subsequently renamed the Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism. 
12
 Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010, 2012) restrict themselves to convex combinations. 
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4.1 Model13 
More formally, let     be defined as the observed value of the variable under 
investigation for region   in time period  . Further, define    
  and    
  to be observations with 
the intervention and without, respectively. We are specifically interested in    , defined to be 
the effect of the intervention for region   at time  . Thus,        
     
 , and        
  
      , where      if region   receives the intervention in time period   and equals zero 
otherwise. For our region of interest, call it region 1,     
     , so that            
  for all  
    , when    is defined as the time of the intervention (disaster event) and the number of 
pre-intervention time periods. 
Abadie et al. (2010) suppose that non-intervention observations,    
 , can be expressed 
in terms of the following factor model: 
   
      t           . 
Here    is an unknown common factor,    is a vector of observed covariates not affected by the 
intervention,    is a vector of unobserved common factors, and    and    are unknown 
parameter vectors. This model differs from a standard differences-in-differences model in that 
   is not restricted to be constant over time.  
Assuming there are   regions not affected by the intervention and     for the affected 
region, a synthetic control is defined by a       weighting vector             .  An 
optimal vector satisfies the following equations: 
∑   
        
   
                  , 
                                                             
13
 Section 4.1 follows the exposition in Abadie et al. (2010). 
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and 
∑   
   
   
       . 
In other words, the weights are constructed such that a weighted sum of control outcomes 
equals the intervention outcome in all pre-intervention periods and the weighted sum of 
control covariates equal the intervention covariates. Abadie et al. (2010) show that this optimal 
vector will satisfy the following equation under standard assumptions, provided the number of 
pre-intervention periods is large relative to the intervention: 
 [   
 ]  ∑   
    
   
   . 
Thus, for     , we can estimate     as follows: 
 ̂       ∑   
    
   
   . 
 
4.2 Implementation 
The first step in computing weights for the synthetic control method is to construct pre-
treatment averages for each determinant of the variable of interest. A simple approach would 
be to take an unweighted average. We go a step further and choose the weights to minimize 
the root mean squared prediction error (RMSPE) over the pre-intervention period. Let    be a 
      vector of pre-intervention averages for the region of interest, where   is defined as the 
number of chosen determinants of the variable of interest. Let    be a       matrix of pre-
intervention averages for all other regions, where   is as defined above. Choose a       
weighting vector  that satisfies the following minimization problem for a given  : 
min           
          . 
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Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) choose   to be a positive semi-
definite diagonal matrix that results in smaller RMSPE for the pre-intervention periods. In the 
2003 paper (p. 128), they show that the Euclidean norm of   can be normalized to  . 
Recognizing  is a function of  , it is clear the choice of V will play an important role in 
determining the relative importance of different predictors of the variable of interest when 
   . In this paper, we construct a counterfactual for each variable using only observations of 
that same variable (i.e. setting   ).    reduces to a scalar (e.g. the pre-intervention 
population average for the region of interest) and    reduces to a       vector (e.g. the vector 
of pre-intervention population averages for the   other regions,                   ). Since 
the Euclidean norm of   can be normalized to 1, we can set the scalar   equal to unity. Thus, 
the optimal  can be redefined as follows:   argmin           
  
While Abadie et al. (2010) restrict weights to be nonnegative and sum to one, given that 
    in the present study, we relax the restrictions on  to accommodate differences in scale 
and to reflect the similar nature of the Hawaiian Islands. Removing the restrictions on the 
optimal weights, so that    , implies the optimal weights satisfy the following equation: 
         
              
 . 
This is an equation of a solution plane in   space (we assume all elements of    are nonzero, or 
equivalently we remove from our “donor pool” any region with a zero average). Thus we have 
identified a continuum of solutions to the minimization problem without constraints.  
In the same vein as Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) when presented with free 
parameters, we select the vector that minimizes the RMSPE of the pre-intervention period. 
Define    as the        matrix of pre-intervention observations from the “donor pool” and    
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as the        vector of pre-intervention observations for Hawaii County. Regressing    on   , 
without a constant and subject to the constraint that the coefficients satisfy the following 
equation, minimizes the RMSPE for the pre-intervention period subject to the set of optimal 
weights14: 
                          
              
            
 . 
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the relevant variables for the pre-intervention period for 
Hawaii Island and for its synthetic counterpart (as calculated above).   
 
4.3 Inference with the Synthetic Control Method 
Adapting the process of classical permutation tests, Abadie et al. (2010, 2012) calculate 
a synthetic control for each of the other regions unaffected by the intervention. These 
“placebos” are calculated as explained above (removing the affected region from the respective 
“donor pool”). For a given     ,  ̂   is compared to the distribution of “placebo” values of  ̂   
for            . This comparison permits the calculation of easily interpretable  -values 
when   is sufficiently large. In our case with    , we graph the values for  ̂   with the values 
for  ̂   for Kauai County and Maui County
15 for both pre and post-intervention periods. If the 
control regions are good controls for each other then a plot of the estimated gaps ( ̂  ) 
between each control and its controls should approximate a horizontal line at zero following 
                                                             
14 In the case of unemployment data, the synthetic is calculated using simple averages, avoiding estimating two 
coefficients with two observations. 
15 The  ̂    for the City and County of Honolulu is excluded from the graphs following the process in Abadie et al. 
(2012) of removing “placebos” with large values during the pre-intervention period. In the case of unemployment, 
Kauai County is removed as a result of this process and both Maui County and the City and County of Honolulu are 
displayed. 
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the intervention (the grey lines in our Gaps graphs), whereas the gap for the affected region 
should be on a visibly different trajectory (the black line in our Gaps graphs). This falsification 
test lends credibility to the effects implied by the synthetic control methodology. 
 
5. Hilo after the tsunami and the counterfactual synthetic control 
5.1 Estimation results 
What did happen in Hilo and the island of Hawaii after the 1960 tsunami? We first 
examine civilian population on the island (figure 1). We observe a dramatic deviation from the 
counterfactual trend that starts in 1960; the population of the island does not increase as the 
counterfactual estimates suggest it would have in the absence of the tsunami event. At a total 
of 77,221 people in 1975, the true population of the island appears to be about 9% lower 
fifteen years after the tsunami than it would have been otherwise (the counterfactual 
population is estimated to be 85,159). The veracity of this result appears to be confirmed when 
we examine the placebo gap estimates (figure 2).16 The placebo results suggest that the model 
becomes less precise in the 1970s (as the gaps for other islands increase as well); but the gaps 
we estimate for Hawaii Island are noticeably larger than for our placebo controls. 
In figure 3, we further investigate the reasons for the population deviations we observe 
in figures 1 and 2. Figure 3 demonstrates that the number of employers also appears to be 
decreasing (relative to the counterfactual). This observation is in line with the Hung (1961) 
observation that most of the businesses that failed in the immediate aftermath of the tsunami 
were small “mom-and-pop” businesses rather than bigger firms that had an easier time 
                                                             
16 By “gap estimate”, we mean  ̂        
   [    
 ]. 
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obtaining credit to fund reconstruction or relocation. Once again, the placebo evidence seems 
to strongly support this finding (figure 4). 
With a lower population but fewer employers, it is unclear what the aggregate effect on 
employment will be. Figure 5 suggests that the tsunami had a negative and persistent impact 
on employment on Hawaii Island. The unemployment rate is above the counterfactual for all 
years post-tsunami and the model suggests that unemployment is approximately 33% higher in 
1975 than what it would have been otherwise (8.6% compared to 6.5%). Figure 6 lends 
credence to figure 5 although the difference between the intervention and placebos is not as 
pronounced as before. 
The most important sector in the island’s economy at the time was sugar (this period 
preceded the rapid increase in tourism that started in the 1970s). For sugar, we observe a very 
dramatic decline around 1960 (relative to an increasing trend), and the sugar economy never 
fully recovers to its counterfactual level (figure 7). The 1970s see the beginning of the terminal 
decline of the industry, but 1960 appears to be a shift unique to Hawaii Island. The other 
agricultural islands (Kauai and Maui) do not experience a similar relative decline in the 1960s 
(see figure 8). Although there was no significant damage to sugar cane fields on Hawaii island, 
the tsunami destroyed key infrastructural, commercial and institutional support underlying the 
sugar industry on the island. 
Finally, we examine total wages on the island (figure 9). We observe no significant 
deviation from the counterfactual (no-tsunami) Hawaii island economy, until the early 1970s. 
By then, the counterfactual and the actual observations deviate from each other. However, we 
observe the same phenomena in the gap estimates for our placebos (the other Hawaiian 
17 
 
counties) – see figure 10. This suggests that total wages on the island were not severely 
impacted by the tsunami. However, there are a number of reasons to be cautious about 
drawing conclusions from the total wages data since data reporting methods changed 
dramatically over the period of interest and not necessarily in a consistent way across counties 
(see Appendix for more explanation). 
 
5.2 Comparing results to previous research 
How do our results compare to previous attempts to estimate the long-term impact of 
catastrophic natural disasters? Using similar methodology to the one described above, Coffman 
and Noy (2012) described the impact of a 1992 hurricane on Kauai Island and duPont and Noy 
(2012) described the impact of the 1995 Kobe earthquake in Japan. In Kauai’s case, Coffman 
and Noy (2012) also describe a similar population decline as the one we observe for the post-
1960 tsunami period on Hawaii Island, while DuPont and Noy (2012) describe only a brief 
population loss with a full demographic recovery within 3-4 years. They find, however, that in 
contrast with Kauai where income per capita recovered fairly quickly as population emigrated, 
Kobe’s per capita incomes never fully recovered from the earthquake, and were still noticeably 
lower 15 years after the fact.  
It seems that in all these cases the aggregate level of economic activity never fully 
recovered, but the exact patterns in which these aggregate difficulties manifested themselves 
varied depending on location, culture, institutions and time-period. Observation of a long-term 
adverse local effect of a natural catastrophe was also recently confirmed by Hornbeck (2012). In 
his paper, Hornbeck examines the long-term impact, at the county level, of the American Dust-
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Bowl event during the 1930s. This was a period of repeated droughts in the American Mid-
Western Plains that led to the erosion of topsoil and dramatic consequent changes in 
agricultural productivity. Hornbeck finds that while there was some adjustment in agricultural 
activities, there were still substantial declines in productivity and land prices that lasted at least 
into the 1950s. The main adjustment mechanism he describes, emigration, is the same one we 
observe for Hilo after the tsunami and that Coffman and Noy (2012) observe for post-hurricane 
Kauai.  
 
6. Conclusion 
What were the long term impacts of the Hilo tsunami of 1960 on Hawaii Island? Years of 
hindsight and a newly developed comparison methodology for case studies with an appropriate 
control group make it possible to assess the long-term economic damages of the 1960 tsunami 
in Hilo. We observe a significant relative population decline; people moved away from the 
affected county in the decade following the tsunami. Since no other shocks that were unique to 
Hawaii Island occurred around 1960, we conclude that population trends deviated for the island 
because of the tsunami event. We also describe a corresponding decrease in the number of 
employers and sugar production in the county, as well as a rise in the unemployment rate that 
explains the motivation behind this emigration. 
It is impossible to know whether the impacts we describe were a direct result of the 
damage wrought by the natural disaster, or because of the attendant shift in expectations 
regarding the likelihood of future events that it most likely generated. We have no direct 
evidence on that point, but the tsunami’s magnitude was clearly unexpected (as many people 
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were injured or killed in spite of an operational warning system), and since this followed on the 
heels of another large tsunami in 1946, it seems likely that the event did generate a new 
realization about the dangers of living and operating businesses in Hilo. The zoning changes 
that resulted from the tsunami, in particular the decision not to rebuild most of the areas 
destroyed by the 1960 tsunami, suggest that the event generated an increase in the expected 
probability of the occurrence of future events. It is important to note that similar changes in 
perceptions about future vulnerabilities also appear to be factors in the aftermath of the Kobe 
earthquake of 1995 as Kobe was previously considered a relatively seismically stable area 
(compared to Tokyo, for example).  
In an assessment of the relevance of these observations to developing countries, we 
note two factors. First, while Hawaii was part of an industrialized country at the time of the 
1960 event, the island was still largely agricultural. However, the presence of a wealthy 
government (at the State and Federal level) that can mobilize significant fiscal resources to 
provide a stimulus and reconstruction support may be important. Poor developing countries 
are less likely to be able to adopt counter-cyclical fiscal policies (Ilzetzki and Végh, 2008); and 
this will make the disaster’s adverse consequences more severe and more persistent.  Foreign 
aid, an important source for reconstruction money for developing countries is also unlikely to 
fill in this financing gap (see Becerra et al., 2012).  
A second relevant observation is that Hawaii Island, our unit of observation, is 
composed of two geographically separate parts: the East Coast that includes Hilo – the county 
seat, and the North-West coast that includes the area now typically referred to as Kailua-Kona, 
after the coastal town and its surrounding region, respectively. Since the tsunami affected only 
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the Hilo side, but we measured aggregate impacts for the entire island, one should view our 
estimates as lower-bounds on the true local impacts. We suspect that should more detailed 
data for Hilo itself become available, larger impacts than we described would be observed.  
The long-term impacts of disaster events are ‘hidden’ due to the difficulty in attributing 
them to an event with the passage of time.  As we document, the long-term regional and local 
costs of disasters can be substantial. An appropriate evaluation of disaster risk reduction and 
mitigation policies should take these regional impacts into account when implementing cost-
benefit analyses.  
Projected climatic changes provide an additional level of complication in determining 
the likelihood of future disasters and planning for disaster risk reduction. As a recent 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report concludes: “Data on disasters and disaster 
risk reduction are lacking at the local level, which can constrain improvements in local 
vulnerability reduction.” (IPCC, 2012, p. 10). They further note that: “Disasters associated with 
climate extremes influence population mobility and relocation, affecting host and origin 
communities (medium agreement, medium evidence). If disasters occur more frequently 
and/or with greater magnitude, some local areas will become increasingly marginal as places to 
live or in which to maintain livelihoods. In such cases, migration and displacement could 
become permanent and could introduce new pressures in areas of relocation.” (IPCC, 2012, p. 
16). Thus, the emerging literature on the long-term costs of coastal disasters should play a 
useful role in understanding and planning for the costs of future climate change.  
  
21 
 
References: 
 
Abadie, A., and J. Gardeazabal (2003), ‘The economic costs of conflict: A case study of the 
Basque country’, American Economic Review 93(1): 113-132. 
 
Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller (2010), ‘Synthetic control methods for comparative 
case studies: Estimating the effect of California's tobacco control program’, Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 105(490): 493-505. 
 
Abadie, A., A. Diamond, and J. Hainmueller (2012). Comparative Politics and the Synthetic 
Control Method. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Aldrich, Daniel (2011). The power of people: social capital’s role in recovery from the 1995 Kobe 
earthquake. Natural Hazards, 56(3), 595-611. 
 
Becerra, O., Cavallo, E., Noy, I., 2010. “In the Aftermath of Large Natural Disasters, What 
Happens to Foreign Aid?” (September). 
 
Carter, Michael R. & Little, Peter D. & Mogues, Tewodaj & Negatu, Workneh, 2007. "Poverty 
Traps and Natural Disasters in Ethiopia and Honduras," World Development, 35(5), 835-856. 
 
Cavallo, E., S. Galiani, I. Noy, and J. Pantano (2010), ‘Catastrophic natural disasters and 
economic growth’, Inter-American Development Bank Research Working Paper #183. 
 
Cavallo, E., and I. Noy (2011), ‘The economics of natural disasters - a survey’, International 
Review of Environmental and Resource Economics 5(1): 1-40. 
 
Coffman, Makena and Ilan Noy (2012). “Hurricane Iniki: Measuring the Long‐Term Economic 
Impact of a Natural Disaster Using Synthetic Control”. Environment and Development 
Economics, 17(2), 187‐205. 
 
Davis, Donald, and David Weinstein, 2002. Bones, Bombs, and Break Points: The Geography of 
Economic Activity.  American Economic Review, 92(5), 1269-1289. 
 
Deryugina, Tatyana, 2011. The Role of Transfer Payments in Mitigating Shocks: Evidence from 
the Impact of Hurricanes. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
duPont, Will, and Ilan Noy, 2012. “What Happened To Kobe? A Reassessment of the Impact of 
the 1995 Earthquake. Unpublished manuscript. 
 
Eaton, J. P., Richter, D. H. and Ault W. U. 1961. The tsunami of May 23, 1960, on the island of 
Hawaii. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America 51, 135–157. 
 
22 
 
Gørgens, Tue, Xin Meng, Rhema Vaithianathan, 2012. Stunting and selection effects of famine: 
A case study of the Great Chinese Famine. Journal of Development Economics 97(1), 99–111. 
 
Hornbeck, Richard. 2012. "The Enduring Impact of the American Dust Bowl: Short- and Long-
Run Adjustments to Environmental Catastrophe." American Economic Review, 102(4): 1477–
1507. 
 
Horwich, G., 2000. “Economic lessons of the Kobe earthquake.” Economic Development 
and Cultural Change, 48(3), 521–542. 
 
Huigen, Marco G.A. and Isabella C. Jens, 2006. Socio-Economic Impact of Super Typhoon 
Harurot in San Mariano, Isabela, the Philippines. World Development Vol. 34, No. 12, pp. 2116–
2136. 
 
Hung, F. C. 1961. Economic Impact of the 1960 Tsunami on South Hilo-Puna. Report prepared 
for the Planning and Traffic Commission, County of Hawaii 
 
Ilzetzki, E., and C. Végh (2008), ‘Procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries: Truth or 
fiction?’, NBER Working paper 14191. 
 
IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change 
Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. 
Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA. 
 
Lachman, R., Tatsuoka, M.and Bonk, W. 1960. Human behavior during the tsunami of May, 
1960. Science 133: 1405-1409. 
 
Loayza, N., E. Olaberría, J. Rigolini, and L. Christiaensen (2012), ‘Natural disasters and growth – 
going beyond the averages’, World Development, 40(7), 1317-1336. 
 
Maccini, Sharon and Dean Yang, 2009. Under the Weather: Health, Schooling, and Economic 
Consequences of Early-Life Rainfall. American Economic Review, 99, No. 3, pp. 1006-1026. 
  
Noy, I. (2009), ‘The macroeconomic consequences of disasters’, Journal of Development 
Economics 88(2): 221-231. 
 
Sawada, Yasuyuki, Satoshi Shimizutani, 2008. How Do People Cope with Natural Disasters? 
Evidence from the Great Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) Earthquake in 1995. Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, 40(2–3), 463-488. 
 
23 
 
Skidmore, M., and H. Toya (2002), ‘Do natural disasters promote long-run growth?’ Economic 
Inquiry 40(4): 664-687. 
 
Solow, R.M., 1956. ‘A contribution to the theory of economic growth’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 70(1), 65-94. 
 
Strobl, E. 2012, ‘The economic growth impact of natural disasters in developing countries: 
Evidence from hurricane strikes in the Central American and Caribbean regions’, Journal of 
Development Economics, 97(1), 131-140. 
 
Vigdor, J. 2008. ‘The economic aftermath of hurricane Katrina.’ Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 22(4): 135-154. 
 
 
  
24 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Civilian Resident Population (Thousands of People) 
1940-1975         
  Min Max Mean Std. Dev. 
Hawaii County 59.33 77.22 64.64 4.30 
C&C of Honolulu 243.27 660.16 430.46 120.45 
Kauai County 25.05 33.71 29.65 1.81 
Maui County 42.24 56.79 46.79 3.67 
     
Total Wages (Millions of Constant 1982-84 USD)  
1951-1975         
  Min Max Mean  Std. Dev. 
Hawaii County 95.00 338.40 182.48 85.40 
C&C of Honolulu 815.80 3811.00 2088.95 1027.83 
Kauai County 50.43 149.60 93.38 33.57 
Maui County 66.51 291.30 139.51 70.54 
     
Number of Employers    
1951-1975         
  Min Max Mean  Std. Dev. 
Hawaii County 864 1579 1117.60 231.40 
C&C of Honolulu 6093 13097 9169.08 2146.58 
Kauai County 334 633 462.92 93.47 
Maui County 496 1243 741.32 218.20 
     
Unemployment Rate    
1958-1975         
  Min Max Mean  Std. Dev. 
Hawaii County 2.7 9.2 4.9 1.92 
C&C of Honolulu 2.6 7.2 4.4 1.58 
Kauai County 3.3 8.2 5 1.61 
Maui County 3.5 10.2 5.8 2.33 
     
Sugar Production (Thousands of Tons) 
1948-1975         
  Min Max Mean  Std. Dev. 
Hawaii County 272.32 464.60 393.32 49.67 
C&C of Honolulu 154.19 238.27 206.17 22.62 
Kauai County 173.89 272.81 235.92 26.94 
Maui County 158.49 303.21 248.57 35.94 
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Table 2: Relevant Variables Before Hilo Tsunami 
    
Hawaii 
County 
Synthetic 
Hawaii 
Civilian Resident Population Min 60.55 60.35 
(Thousands of People) Max 69.45 70.89 
 Mean 64.78 64.87 
  Std. Dev. 2.66 2.75 
Total Wages Min 95 95.4 
(Millions of constant Max 138.9 140 
 1982-84 USD) Mean 103.66 103.63 
  Std. Dev. 12.74 13.1 
Number of Employers Min 864 861 
 Max 919 925 
 Mean 887.33 887.57 
  Std. Dev. 17.33 17.95 
Unemployment Rate Min 2.7 2.7 
 Max 3.9 3.9 
 Mean 3.30 3.30 
 Std. Dev. 0.60 0.60 
Sugar Production Min 272.32 274.89 
(Thousands of Tons) Max 412.21 432.36 
 Mean 355.74 354.44 
  Std. Dev. 49.46 51.63 
Note: Civilian Resident Population statistics are calculated for the period 
1940-1959. Total Wages and Number of Employees cover 1951-1959. 
Unemployment Rate pre-tsunami periods are 1958 and 1959. Sugar 
Production statistics are calculated from 1948 to 1959.   
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Figure 1: Civilian Resident Population (in thousands), 1940-1975. The synthetic control is the dashed line, while the actual 
series is the solid line. Source: Intercensal population estimates, Dept. of Planning and Econ. Development, State of Hawaii. 
 
Figure 2: The black line represents the estimated effect for Hawaii County (in percentage points). The gray lines represent the 
"placebo" effects for Kauai County and Maui County. Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 3: Number of Employers, 1951-1975. The synthetic control is the dashed line, while the actual series is the solid line. 
Source: Employment and Payrolls annual reports, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. 
 
Figure 4: The black line represents the estimated effect for Hawaii County. The gray lines represent the "placebo" effects for 
Kauai County and Maui County. Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5: Unemployment Rate (%), 1958-1975. The synthetic control is the dashed line, while the actual series is the solid line. 
Source: Hawaii County Data Book, State of Hawaii Data Book.
 
Figure 6: The black line represents the estimated effect for Hawaii County. The gray lines represent the "placebo" effects for 
Kauai County and the City and County of Honolulu. Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 7: Sugar Production, 1948-1975. The synthetic control is the dashed line, while the actual series is the solid line. Source: 
Annual Reports, Chamber of Commerce of Hawaii.
 
Figure 8: The black line represents the estimated effect for Hawaii County. The gray lines represent the "placebo" effects for 
Kauai County and Maui County. Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 1: Total Wages, 1951-1975. The synthetic control is the dashed line, while the actual series is the solid line. Source: 
Employment and Payrolls annual reports, Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. 
 
Figure 2: The black line represents the estimated effect for Hawaii County. The gray lines represent the "placebo" effects for 
Kauai County and Maui County. Source: authors’ calculations. 
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Appendix 
Job Count (figure A1) and Total Wages (figure A2) data, from the “Employment and Payrolls” 
reports, exhibit erratic behavior as seen in the percentage change figures below. We believe 
this is related to a series of legislative reforms affecting reporting requirements for agricultural 
employment beginning in 1957 and ending in 1961. The same volatility is not present in the 
Number of Employers (figure A3) data from the same source. 
 
 
Figure A1: Percent change of Job Count from previous year, 1952-1975. Source: Employment and Payrolls annual reports, 
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. 
 
Figure 3: Percent change of Job Count from previous year, 1952-1975. Source: Employment and Payrolls annual reports, 
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. 
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Figure 4: Percent change of Job Count from previous year, 1952-1975. Source: Employment and Payrolls annual reports, 
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations, State of Hawaii. 
